Well once again, the Democrats are seaching for "proof" that BushCo "lied" us into the war in Iraq. The new argument is that he "cherry-picked" intelligence, most specifically, intelligence concerning an Iraq/al-Qaeda connection.

Before I go through the hassle of debunking this, let me remind you that past attempts at making it appear as though Bush intentionally misled us, have for the most part, utterly failed.

The first example was the so-called "16 words" speech that Bush gave during his State of the Union in 2003. In case you are one of about 2% of Americans who have not yet memorized the words by heart, they were as follows:

The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

To this day, the left robotically cites this as "evidence" that Bush "lied" (or, if you're talking to a really bright one, proof that he's a "lying liar.")

The reason why it was assumed that Bush had lied was because it had been indisputedly discovered that a number of forged documents about Iraq seeking uranium from Niger were sent to intelligence agencies by an Italian. Via Wikipedia:

[I]n March 2003, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released results of his analysis of the documents. Reportedly, it took IAEA officials only a matter of hours to determine that these documents were fake. Using little more than a Google search, IAEA experts discovered indications of a crude forgery, such as the use of incorrect names of Nigerian officials. As a result, the IAEA reported to the U.N. Security Council that the documents were "in fact not authentic."

 So, from then to even today, this has been cited as a lie and as a falsehood.

One problem: it is now, perhaps even more so than then, undeniably true that British intelligence believed this, and, furthermore, a British review on pre-war intellligence discovered that their report on Iraq seeking yellowcake uranium was not based on the forged documents.

Chances are you've never heard of the "Butler Review." It was an independent review of British intelligence pre-Iraq war. Remember: Bush cited British intelligence, so it matters what the British have found concerning the claims. The Butler Review says:

There has been significant controversy surrounding the reliability of Government statements about Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa. We have therefore studied this issue in detail.

[,,,]

From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:

a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in1999.

b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible.

c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.

d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.

So we know now that Bush was correct. Thus, it isn't a lie.

Now, however, liberals have found a brand-spanking new smoking gun...

Sen. Carl Levin (D) has recently stirred up controversy over a claim that President Bush made in his 2002 Cincinnati Speech, selling the war in Iraq. Bush claimed that  "we've learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases."

Levin has since declassified a document put out by the DIA by the time this statement was made, that disputed this fact on the grounds that the source was not credible. The New York Times reported:

A high Qaeda official in American custody was identified as a likely fabricator months before the Bush administration began to use his statements as the foundation for its claims that Iraq trained Al Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons, according to newly declassified portions of a Defense Intelligence Agency document. The document, an intelligence report from February 2002, said it was probable that the prisoner, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, "was intentionally misleading the debriefers" in making claims about Iraqi support for Al Qaeda's work with illicit weapons.

The document provides the earliest and strongest indication of doubts voiced by American intelligence agencies about Mr. Libi's credibility. Without mentioning him by name, President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, and other administration officials repeatedly cited Mr. Libi's information as "credible" evidence that Iraq was training Al Qaeda members in the use of explosives and illicit weapons.

Sounds pretty bad, doesn't it? Why would Bush repeat a claim made by someone that the DIA claimed "was intentionally misleading debriefers"? Wouldn't that be a blatant distortion?  Why did Bush do this?

Answer? Because the head of intelligence at that time persisted in lending the disputed individual, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, and his claims, credibility.

To clarify, let us remember that it was not until recently that there was a Director of National Intelligence who was independent from the CIA. To quote, "Before April 21, 2005, the DCIA was not only the head of the CIA but also the leader of the entire U.S. Intelligence Community in the position of Director of Central Intelligence." At this time, therefore, George Tenet was the head of U.S. intelligence. He was the principal intelligence advisor to the President. He met with the President frequently in intelligence issues and informed him on what he needed to know.

George Tenet was not telling Bush that the claims that Iraq was training Qaeda members in using weapons was based on an unreliable source. In fact, four months after Bush's Cincinnati speech, on February 11, 2003, Tenet was still selling this claim:

Iraq has, in the past, provided training in document forgery and bomb making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.

This was even after Colin Powell made the case for the Iraq war to the U.N. of Feb. 5, 2003. Can this really be considered "cherry-picking": trusting your head of intelligence? Shouldn't Tenet be held more liable, for failing to take into account the DIA report when he went around selling Ibn's story?

Carl Levin can't even confirm for sure whether or not the Bush administration its self ever saw the document, according to the Washington Post:

He said that he could not be certain that White House officials read the DIA report, but his "presumption" was that someone at the National Security Council saw it because it was sent there.

Carl Levin also claims that he gained access to a January 2003 CIA brief that claimed that the source of the info being spread "was not in a position to know if any training had taken place." This one was classified. The aforementioned New York Times article says that "At the time of Mr. Powell's speech, an unclassified statement by the C.I.A. described the reporting, now known to have been from Mr. Libi, as 'credible.' " but that "Levin said he had learned that a classified C.I.A. assessment at the time went on to state that 'the source was not in a position to know if any training had taken place.' "

But there's a problem with that. If it is the case that the CIA, in a classified document, discredited Ibn, then why did Sen. Levin give his approval for Phase I of the Senate Intelligence Committee's Report on pre-war intelligence? In it, the committee studied the part of Powell's presentation where he discussed terrorism, and, in its conclusions, said this:

Conclusion 103. The information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency for the terrorism portion of Secretary Powell's speech was carefully vetted by both terrorism and regional analysts.

Conclusion 104. None of the portrayals of the intelligence reporting included in Secretary Powell's speech differed in any significant way from earlier assessments published by the Central Intelligence Agency.

If this CIA report did in fact exist, as Levin claims, then he certainly should not have approved such language.

So this is the conclusion:

George Tenet, the director of the entire intelligence community at the time, persisted in advancing the theory that Ibn was a credible source, by continually citing his information now known to have been purposely misleading. He, the director of all intelligence activities, obviously did not put a lot of stock in the DIA report discrediting his name. And, if a classified CIA document in January did imply again that Ibn was not credible then a. Tenet should have taken note of his own Agency's findings and not continued to refer to Ibn's stories during his February 11, 2003 testimony before the Senate; and b. Mr. Levin should not have endorsed language implying that Powell's statements before the U.N. did not differ from any assessments from the CIA.